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Dancing with Socrates: telling truths about the self  




This article seeks to consider how and in what ways somatic 
practice in relation to contemporary dance and movement 
performance might participate in the telling of truths about the body 








Somatics is relevant to a wide range of movement practices, 
including dance, in as much as it is a set of practices that exists in 
the relationship between notions of the body and notions of the self 
as a knowing subject. I am assuming from the start that a central 
impulse at the heart of somatic practice is to dissolve the inner and 
outer sense of self as part of a technology of the care of the self, 
and I am then positioning this impulse as a desire to in some 
important senses tell truths about the body. I will seek to draw out 
the potential significances of such a position for those teaching 
movement and contemporary dance – particularly in relation to the 
nature of the truths are we seeking to tell, how we tell them and to 
whom. I am also beginning from a position that, after Foucault and 
Butler, accepts that the body, somatics and movement practices 
must be understood as having their own social and cultural 
histories, and that the body, its practices and those truths it seeks 
to reveal are thus historically and socially constituted.  
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The distinctions between what have become popularly identified as 
the inner and the outer selves began as a problem of artistic 
expression for the romantic artists of the nineteenth century. The 
struggle to bring to outer expression the deepest and most 
profound impulses and imaginings of the inner self was at the heart 
of the nineteenth century artist’s condition. By the twentieth 
century the problem had shifted from the romantic struggle of the 
artist to find expression towards a problem of technique. For the 
twentieth century artist, dancer or performer, it was not just a 
question of what to say but of how to say it. This can be perceived 
in the movement away from the production of a specific, idealized 
dancing body, only attained or attainable by the lucky few, towards 
what were perceived as natural (de-urbanised, unconstricted, non-
hierarchical, healthy and unharmful) processes of body use and 
embodied learning that could be taught, learnt and written about.  
 
The increased focus on the issue of technique within twentieth 
century performance is a socio-economic and cultural process that I 
have previously, in my book on movement training for actors, 
linked to the rise in emphasis on efficiency, and efficient movement 
and body use, across Western societies. Despite the twentieth 
century emphasis on technique and process, many of the new 
approaches to the training of the performer’s body that were 
developed during this period, and which were based on an 
understanding of how the body functions most efficiently, were still 
deeply predicated on universalized assumptions about the body. In 
relation to actor training I drew on Jen Tarr’s work (2002) on the 
discourses underpinning somatic practices to identify these 
dominant paradigms in the early twentieth century as the child, the 
animal, the noble savage and the Ancient Greek.  
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These various paradigms can be understood as representing late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century notions of truth about the 
body, for instance that there is a way of being within the body that 
has been lost to the city-dwelling modern adult that is in some 
important respects identified as healthier, more efficient, less 
repressive and that offers a more holistic experience of being 
human.  The effects of such discursive shifts can be seen on the 
work of practitioners such as Laban and Duncan – where they 
danced, how they danced, and who they worked with. Foucault 
reminds us that such truths are historically and socially constructed. 
In this respect, these four paradigms locate the idea of the natural 
body, and the training and learning processes that grew out of 
these paradigms, within historical discourses of power expressed 
through the complex tensions between human/animal, child/adult, 
rural/urban, savage/civilized and classical/modern. The educational 
processes of somatic practice grew out of the same historical 
discourses and in a similar manner tended to privilege those ways 
of being in the self that are perceived as in such respects unsullied.  
 
Somatics in this respect has certainly set out to enable us to tell 
truths about the lived experience of the modern city dwelling 
European or American by challenging the ways that urban living 
writes its effects on the body. But it also exists within a history of 
the body that positions bodily practices in relation to patriarchal 
power. Tellingly within the historical paradigms for the natural body 
- the lost athleticism of the Ancient Greek or the ‘savage’, the lost 
physical innocence and playfulness of the child or the animal – the 
female body occupies a contested and often marginalized space. 
Somatics in this respect has operated radically to create a space for 
the female body to tell truths about its own athleticism, sincerity, 
purity, integrity, and expressivity, as well as its many other 
qualities. Dance and somatic practice has increasingly, from the 
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early twentieth-century work of Duncan, Graham and others, 
sought in this way to create a space for the female body to be 
physically engaged and to be expressive. For both male and female 
bodies dance and care of the embodied self allows for the 
experience of the lived body to become more present in the 
construction of the sense of self. For this to become radical the 
knowledges created in this way need to be set in the context of the 
dominant paradigms for the gendered body – the dancing subject 
needs to dance out (of) the context which creates his or her 
historicized body, creating a new sense of embodied self through a 
constant care to interrogate how their existing self is and has been 
created.  
 
Equally, the notion of the savage body also clearly represents 
particular operations of power, most evidently through the cultural 
implications of the word ‘savage’. This word historically implies a 
Eurocentric perspective towards a body that is both ethnically black 
and also unrestrained in its physicality and possibly violent. In so 
far as this notion participates in the construction of paradigms for 
the natural body, it situates this body within a Darwinian framework 
where the savage body may be perceived as in some way closer to 
an earlier form of human embodied subjectivity. F. M. Alexander 
privileged the ‘primitive’ as ‘an example of the human body 
untainted by the effects of modern urban and industrial society’ 
(Evans 2009: 77). Alexander’s admiration for the savage is however 
tempered by his suspicion that free expression is potentially 
intoxicating and dangerous: 
 
music and dancing are, as every one knows, excitements 
which make a stronger appeal to the primitive than to the 
more highly evolved races. No drunken man in our civilization 
ever reaches the stages of anaesthesia and complete loss of 
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self-control attained by the savage under the influence of 
these two stimuli. (Alexander 1986: 100) 
 
For Alexander then, the route to natural physical expression is 
through training and education and not through free expression. 
The above quotation, taken originally from Alexander’s 1918 revised 
edition of Man’s Supreme Inheritance: Conscious Guidance and 
Control in Relation to Human Evolution, helps to identify how the 
concept of the naturally expressive body has to be understood, right 
from the early years of the twentieth century, as part of a complex 
socio-cultural, historical and ethnically contingent relationship 
between dance, training, civilization and self-control.  
 
The paradox for somatic practice then is that it represents a form of 
training that has continually had to seek to remove the body from 
its own history. Somatic practices participate in the same tensions 
inherent in any training practice - all training regimes embody 
power in ways particular to their own histories - and if we seek only 
to remove the body from its history into some anatomically 
authenticated truth we must be alert to the cultural history of that 
anatomical truth. A retreat towards anatomy as the locus of truth 
within the body throws up complex issues around disability and 
cultural difference that are most evident in the ways that different 
cultures view posture, movement and agility. Somatic practice 
might be taken to be truthful to knowledges of the body if only in 
the extent to which it follows the body’s anatomical design and the 
extent to which its movement is harmonious, effortless and 
efficient. However, what needs addressing is whether that is enough 
as a claim to truthfulness or whether what is important is the 
difference between our bodily practices and the contexts within 
which they function and which shape and restrict them. 
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So, if we place the body and our lived experience of the body as the 
only locus of truth we run the risk of missing the manner in which 
our experience of our body is shaped by our own cultural history of 
our embodiment. In experiencing our lived body we must at the 
same time experience its/our shaping and the ways in which its/our 
coming in to being result from the operation of power. Michael 
Peters in his article on Foucault and truth-telling (2003) argues that 
knowledge is about the body and of the body, and therefore it is not 
constituted solely by what we can say or write about the body but 
rather by the collection of bodily practices that we employ at this 
point in history. What then needs examination is the set of practices 
that reproduce that knowledge and their relationship to the telling 
of truth about the power that operates on and through them. What 
we know through the body should therefore be understood as 
knowledge that is historically and culturally constituted, that draws 
on the ways in which power has operated on our bodies. The ‘felt-
sense’ of the body cannot exist as knowledge outside the practices 
(both physical and intellectual) through which we construct our 
experiences, knowledges and ideas. Its claims to truth in this sense 
sit in relation to the phenomenological project to relocate 
knowledge within and in relationship to the body. As cultural 
importance and significance is given to the body, so somatics is able 
to make stronger claims for truth and knowledge. Through dance 
then, truths about the body may now be told with greater vigour 
and confidence; truths that might for instance point out the ways in 
which habituated uses of the body realize specific operations of 
power upon the body. 
 
We realize and identify habituated use of the body through the 
differences experienced in contrast to efficient body use, and in 
relation to our body awareness. The problem in a postmodern, post-
positivist world is establishing or even seeking a viewpoint from 
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which to make such observations. If there can be no one essential 
locus from which to identify the experiences of the body, how can 
we ever be certain of what we feel in a sense that allows us to 
make claims for truth? The body which we seek to bring to 
knowledge is thus always vacillating between being known and 
unknown, dancing continually at the edges of our reach. Knowledge 
in this context is a continual process of becoming aware, the body 
in a permanent state of becoming. The process of telling the truth 
becomes as important as the truth statement itself. Nonetheless, if 
we must take a position, one that acknowledges the body and 
confronts the ways in which it is shaped through its experiences is 
surely the best place to start.  
 
For the student performer, the training process both acknowledges 
the specific sense of an inner space that is inhabited by a personal 
self and also then goes on to enable that inner self to become 
increasingly evident within the realm of the outer space. This is the 
process through which the student performer becomes a 
professional who can open up themselves and their embodied 
experience in a way that is in general acceptable because it is under 
their control and aesthetically orientated. The student typically 
learns to be vulnerable and comfortable at the same time. To be 
alert to one’s vulnerability and aware of one’s own functioning and 
yet still to function with confidence requires a particular openness to 
experience, an ability to tell a complex truth about what it means to 
perform through the body. This sense of movement and playfulness 
around the self as embodied subject and its claims to 
(self)knowledge and truth is echoed in Foucault’s notion of the 
‘game of truth’. For Foucault the ‘game of truth’, which can refer to 
scientific models or to models inherent in institutions or practices of 
control, is understood as ‘an ensemble of rules for the production of 
truth’ (Foucault in Peters 2003: 211). Also apparent within the 
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conception of somatic practice outlined above is the sense in which 
the student takes on responsibility for self-knowledge, which I 
would suggest is aligned to what Foucault in his later writings calls 
‘care of the self’, an approach according to Peters, ‘whereby the 
individual can come to know himself (sic) as well as take care of 
himself—twin themes in the inherited Western ethical tradition 
associated with specific techniques of truth-telling practices that 
human beings apply to understand themselves’  (Peters 2003: 209). 
In Peters view, Foucault develops this as ‘an ‘aesthetics of 
existence’, where the subject learns the obligations involved in ‘care 
for the self’’ (Peters 2003: 212), and where right living is conceived 
of as having an aesthetic as well as an ethical dimension. 
 
If we feel an obligation as part of our care for ourselves and for 
others to try to tell the truth of and through the body, how can we 
set about doing so given the complexities that surround our notions 
of embodied truth. Drawing on Michael Peters’ article on Foucault 
and educational practice (2003), I wish to consider Foucault’s 
discussion of the Greek concept of parrhesia (truth-telling) and 
reflect on the extent to which it may offer us guidance when 
considering how and in what contexts we can conceive of dance as 
telling truths about the body. The Greeks understood parrhesia as a 
form of frankness and free speech, of knowing the truth and 
conveying it fearlessly to others. What is significant in the Greek 
concept of parrhesia is the requirement for the speaker to have the 
courage to tell the truth, and to acknowledge the danger of doing 
so. The parrhesiastes (the teller of truth) was a role for those who 
were of lower social status than those to whom they told the truth, 
and in part this is where the danger for them lay. But this power 
dynamic is also what freed the statements they made to be truth 
and not just orthodoxy or instruction. Truth becomes valuable in 
this construction because it speaks from the oppressed to the 
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oppressors, from the dispossessed to those who already have; such 
a concept of the nature of truth stands in contrast to the 
conventional egocentric notion of truthfulness measured only in 
relation to internal, self-referencing criteria. 
 
So what parrhesiastic truths can somatic dance tell? I suggest that 
the presentation of the body as an efficient, integrated and 
expressive whole is not, in and of itself, an expression of truth in 
Foucault’s sense. Just as the inefficient, clumsy and inexpressive 
body is not, in and of itself, a lie – it is a true representation of the 
state of the embodied subject at that point in time. Both integrated 
and inexpressive or clumsy bodies are representations of the 
exercise of power and knowledge on the body or of the resistance of 
such exercise, just as Iris Young argues in her 1990 essay on 
feminine body use and spatiality, ‘Throwing Like a Girl’. When dance 
(or indeed movement practice) tells the truth in this context it is 
communicating how the embodied subject has positioned 
themselves in relation to the power/knowledge that is seeking to 
act or is already acting on their bodies and on the construction of 
their bodies. In doing so, it reveals the action of power/knowledge 
and enables the person watching or participating to recognize and 
share in that revelation. This truth-telling may not, indeed need not, 
take place in an overtly politicized context, although the results will 
inevitably be that the receiver of truth will be confronted at some 
level with the requirement to decide how to act in relation to that 
truth. Parrhesiastic dance or movement could then be understood 
as a practice that seeks to identify domains of power within the 
body and negotiate where and in what ways resistance, 
reconfiguration or play might be possible. Dance thus becomes 
what Foucault calls an ‘art of life’, relating to the care of the self. 
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In his 1983 talks on parrhesia, Foucault goes on to ask: ‘how can 
we distinguish the good, truth-telling teachers from the bad or 
inessential ones?’ (Foucault 1999: 35). Similarly we might ask what 
makes a good teacher within the context of somatic practice that 
tells the truth about the body. I think that what Foucault suggests 
here is interesting in relation to the teaching of somatic practice, 
and, despite the gendered language, merits quoting at length: 
 
the master still uses frankness of speech with the disciple in 
order to help him become aware of the faults he cannot see 
[…]; but now the use of parrhesia is put increasingly upon the 
disciple as his own duty towards himself. At this point the 
truth about the disciple is not disclosed solely through the 
parrhesiastic discourse of the master, or only in the dialogue 
between the master and the disciple or interlocutor. The truth 
about the disciple emerges from a personal relation which he 
establishes with himself. (Foucault 1999) 
 
Foucault also proposes a responsibility towards the self that is not 
punitive or judgmental. Instead he describes the attitude that the 
disciple, or in this case the student/dancer, might take towards 
themselves as that of a technician, craftsperson or artist ‘who – 
form from time to time – stops working, examines what he (sic) is 
doing, reminds himself of the rule of his art, and compares these 
rules with what he has achieved thus far’ (Foucault 1999). This 
approach is a critical but caring form of reflection that participates 
in the work of caring for the self; for one of the purposes of 
examining the truth about oneself must be to improve oneself, as 
well as to tell that truth to someone else. In so far as danger is 
involved in this process, it is the danger of hurt, harm and 
vulnerability. It can take courage to speak the truth about your own 
body or someone else’s body.  
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Perhaps the most courageous position that one can take is in 
relation to the body (either one’s own or that of another) that does 
not meet socially constructed norms, that has chosen to reject 
those norms, or that is ‘damaged’ in relation to those norms 
whether intentionally or not. The transformed body of Orlan or 
Stelarc, the transgendered body, the disabled body and the self-
harmed body are all bodies that are not conventionally perceived as 
healthy or natural, but that through their differences sometimes 
actively seek to tell truths about the embodied self, the body and its 
social construction. Well-being, health and happiness are important 
outcomes of somatic practice, and clearly desirable. They must be 
allowed to reside not only in the integrated body but also, in some 
important senses, in the body that offers a different context and 
meaning for that integration. What enables the body perceived as 
different to tell the truth in this context is that the difference is 
consciously manipulated by the subject, who retains some level of 
control over the ways in which power operates on their body. In this 
sense obsessive body behaviours may reveal ways in which power 
can operate destructively on the embodied subject, but they leave 
less room for the subject concerned to tell truths about the body. 
The dancer with an eating disorder has limited opportunities to tell 
the truth about their embodiment, the context they find themselves 
in can function to create a stronger need to lie. The disabled dancer 
who is able to express the ways in which their body constructs its 
own integration may well be more able to tell truths in this sense. 
 
The world is not short of people who would seek to make 
statements about our bodies or indeed about their own bodies. The 
problem then becomes how to recognize ‘who is capable of speaking 
the truth within the limits of an institutional system where everyone 
is equally entitled to give his or her own opinion’ (Foucault 1999). 
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Peters outlines the following qualities of Socratic parrhesia which I 
would like to consider in the context of the aims of this article: first, 
close proximity, ‘a personal, face to face context’; and second 
‘where the listener is led by the Socratic logos into ‘giving an 
account’ (didonai logon) of himself and the kind of life he has lived’ 
(Peters 2003: 214). In somatic practice we might take the first for 
granted as a typical precondition of the work – the teacher 
traditionally works alongside the student, but the second implies a 
form of reflection and account-giving that may not always be 
present. Peters (2003: 214) goes on to suggest that the Socratic 
role is then to determine ‘the degree of accord between a person’s 
life and its principle of intelligibility or logos’ (Foucault 1999). In 
revealing the distance between the life lived and the principles 
through which one might wish to live that life the student/dancer is 
encouraged to care for the manner in which their life is lived and to 
educate themselves towards that goal. The teacher becomes a good 
teacher, because, as Peters says about Socrates, ‘there is an 
ontological harmony between his words (logoi) and his deeds 
(erga)’ (Peters 2003: 214). In the same way, the somatic dancer 
becomes an artist to be attended to, because what they seek to 
communicate and the body through which they communicate are in 
ontological harmony. What the somatic dancer does, they seek to 
do in accord with what they think about the embodied nature of 
their existence, and vice versa. In this respect, Peters suggests, the 
truth game is no longer simply about telling the truth to others, but 
also about becoming courageous enough to tell the truth about 
oneself. Peters rigorously argues that the commensurate exercise of 
askesis, ‘the practical training or exercise directed at the art of 
living’ (Peters 2003: 216), requires not the renunciation of the self 
and the removal of the self from the world familiar through 
Christian ascetic practices, but the development of ‘a specific 
relationship to oneself—a relationship of self possession and self-
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sovereignty’ that enables the subject to ‘confront the world in an 
ethical and rational manner’ (Peters 2003: 216). In his discussion of 
parrhesia Foucault thus moves the emphasis away from the teacher 
as the truth-teller towards the student taking on this responsibility 
‘as a duty toward himself’ (Peters 2003: 216). 
 
Finally Foucault reminds us to ask ourselves ‘what is the importance 
for the individual and for the society of telling the truth, of knowing 
the truth, of having people who tell the truth, as well as knowing 
how to recognize them’ (Foucault in Peters 2003: 217). Why should 
the practice of truth-telling be considered more valuable or 
important for dance and movement students than equipping them 
with sets of commercially valuable skills for success in the wider 
creative industries and knowledge economies? Cannot the efficient 
and healthy sensing of lived experience through the body be 
enough in and of itself? Rouhiainen (2008: 245) reminds us to be 
wary of allowing the lived experience of our bodies to be taken as 
representing a reality that could be prioritized over other forms of 
experience. Nonetheless, she suggests, awareness of the way we 
are in the world can operate as part of a process that brings to 
awareness the extent to which perception ‘is a culturally ingrained 
interpretation of being’ (Rouhiainen 2008: 244). How we conceive 
of this distinction between our lived experience and its cultural 
construction, and how we practice around and within it and attempt 
to overcome it, are at the heart of understanding how somatics 
relates to the performance of dance and movement and the telling 
of truth about our selves through such activity.  
 
Somatic practices can create the conditions in which bodily habits 
that do not normally reach our conscious awareness can be 
identified and challenged. The ways in which habitual body use 
embodies ideological positions in relation to the subject can thus be 
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revealed and somatic practices can work to reveal the docility 
implicit or potentially present in much conventional performance 
training. A potential danger is that the somatic practices themselves 
become a form of habit; that they become no longer a process, a 
way of becoming, but a pattern of experience that embodies its own 
ideologies. If somatics becomes just another form of training rather 
than also a way of interrogating the training process then it reduces 
its capacity for resistance.  
 
In summary then, the somatic training of student dancers aims to 
remove from them the burden of imitating what they understand as 
perfect movement, and to enable them to develop and then trust in 
an inherent wisdom of the body. This creates a concept of dance as 
a form of critically reflective practice that enables the student, at 
least as a starting point in their practice, to become more like 
themselves through movement. It thus implicitly creates a concept 
of dance as in part, and like many other forms of arts practice, a 
form of self-education and self-development. Being true to the self 
can in this context be conceptualized as being true to the physical 
self, to the body, and importantly to the ways in which we believe 
that the physical life should be lived. Such a sense of truth must, I 
suggest, also be based on reference to the wider social context and 
the ways in which we acknowledge the operation of power on our 
bodies. The dancer should be well placed to understand how the 
repressed physical self is typically naturalized and normalized 
through everyday processes and to appreciate how, without 
interruption, this process leads to the repressed body becoming an 
unconditional referent. What we might mean by telling the truth 
through dance then is that student can realize and reveal what is 
created and normalized and how, and the doing of this through 
their dance practice is part of building and sustaining a harmony 
between words and deeds. Whilst the knowledge that they make 
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can never be neutral and will always be contingent, the telling of 
truth in this way is an important political act even and as it is 
performed through the body. Knowing why we should tell the truth 
through dance and knowing what that might mean place somatics 
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